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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a divorce action and includes hearings subsequent
to trial to fix child support and alimony payments.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

Respondent was granted

a Decree of Divorce from Appellant on the grounds of mental
cruelty.

No award of alimony or child support was made at the

time of trial, due to Appellant's temporary inability to earn
income.

In a subsequent hearing brought on by Respondent,

Respondent was granted an award of child support in the amount
of $700.00 per month ($350.00 per month for each of the parties'
two minor children) and an award of alimony in the amount of
$300.00 per month.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the striking or reduction to nominal of
the award of alimony and a reduction of child support payments
from $350.00 to $200.00 per month per child.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on June 10, 1955.

Two minor

children of the parties (Pearson, age 17, and-Carter, age 10)
reside with Respondent.
Respondent is a partner in a small business.
is a thoracic surgeon.

Appellant

Appellant established his practice in

Utah; but in 1975 an emotional disorder ended this practice.
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In March, 1976, after the divorce, Appellant was able to resume
his medical practice in California.
The trial court found Respondent's annual taxable income
to be $11,200 [R., p. 89,
ing.

~

8].

Appellant disputes this find-

The trial court found Appellant's annual taxable income

to be $66,692.00 [R. p. 89, II 6].

Appellant disputes this find-

ing.

ARGUMENT
1. IN FIXING ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY, THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT USE THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD ANNOUNCED BY THIS COURT.
A.
THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN FIXING A
REASONABLE AWARD OF ALIMONY INCLUDE:
1) THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS AND NEEDS OF THE WIFE, 2) THE ABILITY OF THE WIFE TO
PRODUCE SUFFICIENT INCOME FOR HERSELF, AND 3) THE ABILITY OF
THE HUSBAND TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.
In Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971),
cited with approval by the Court in English v. English, No.
14760, filed June 2, 1977, --- Utah 2d ---, the court observed
that the criteria to be considered in fixing a reasonable award
for alimony include the financial conditions and needs of the
wife, the ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for
herself, and the ability of the husband to provide support.
English, supra, the Court noted that the standard appropriate
to fixing alimony differs from the standard to be employed in
dividing the assets of a married couple on their divorce:
The standard utilized by the trial court
[to fix an award of alimony], viz., the length of
the marriage and the contributions of each to
their joint financial success, is not an appropriate
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measure to determine alimony.
There is a distinction
between the division of assets accumulated during
the.marriage, _which should be distributed upon an
equita~le basis, and the post-marital duty of support
and maintenance.
The purpose of alimony is to provide
support for the wife and not to inflict
punitive damages on the husband. Alimony
is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor reward to the wife. . . .
[Citing
2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment (2d Ed. 1961
Rev. Vol.) § 14.06, pp. 11-12.]
[Emphasis
added.]
B. THE CRITERIA USED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN FIXING AN
AWARD OF ALIMONY ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED
BY THIS COURT.
The trial court, in awarding alimony to Respondent,
applied a standard inconsistent with that announced by this
Court.

In its Memorandum Opinion the trial court states:
. . . as far as alimony is concerned, the Court
feels it would be inequitable at this time and
under the present circumstances to award either
the full $500.00 per month requested [as alimony]
by [Respondent], or no alimony or the token alimony requested by [Appellant].
It is true that
the [Respondent] through enterprise and perhaps
necessity, does have a far better income than the
average female this Court sees. Moreover, the
Court acknowledges that in one sense [Resporident]
does not "need" alimony in that she probably could
subsist without it, and in fact has done so for
approximately the last two years. However, and
despite the foregoing, the Court feels wholly
justified in making the alimony award it has and
believes this award is amply supportable under
the guidelines laid down in the numerous decisions
of our Supreme Court.
In making that award the
Court has considered, among other things, (1) the
length of this marriage, (2) [Respondent's] assistance to [Appellant] during the lean years from
June 1955 to 1970 and during which [Appellant]
prepared himself for his present profession of
cardiovascular surgery and particularly, (3) the
present disparity in the [Respondent's] and
[Appellant's] income and the disparity of their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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income potential.

[R., p. 71-72, emphasis added.]

It is clear that the trial court has committed the very error
warned against in English, supra, by confusing the standard
appropriate to division of assets with the standard appropriate
to awarding alimony.

The considerations relied upon by the

trial court are precisely those proscribed in English.
The trial court's award of alimony is designed to reward
Respondent and penalize Appellant.

The trial court has attemp-

ted to bring the parties' "income potential" into parity,
without reference to Respondent's needs.

Shall Appellant be

penalized because he is a surgeon, without reference to
Respondent's needs?

Shall Respondent be rewarded because she

is not a surgeon, without reference to her needs?

Signifi-

cantly, the trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion,
quoted above, that establishing parity of "income potential"
was a "particularly" important aspect of its deliberations.

2.
UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD THE AWARD OF ALIMONY
SHOULD BE STRICKEN OR REDUCED TO NOMINAL AND THE AWARD OF CHILD
SUPPORT SHOULD BE REDUCED TO $200.00 PER MONTH PER CHILD.
A. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT IS CAPABLE OF
PRODUCING SUFFICIENT INCOME TO MEET HER NEEDS.
As the trial court's Memorandum Opinion, cited above,
tacitly admits, if Respondent's request for alimony were considered under the appropriate standard (her financial condition
and needs and her ability to produce sufficient income, together with Appellant's ability to pay), an award of alimony
would be inappropriate in this case.
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The trial court found that Respondent's annual taxable
income was $11,200 [R. p. 89,

~

8].

The evidence of record,

however, does not support this finding, which was based on
Respondent's 1976 income.

During the first quarter of 1977

Respondent was paid a gross salary of $1,700 per month and
on this basis her 1977 annual taxable income is $20,400.[T., 17).
Respondent's business accountant testified that 1) Respondent's partnership would not be capable of continuing to pay
her a salary of $20,400 annually based on the record of the
partnership during the first three months of 1977, which showed
a $1,700 loss to the partnership; and 2) that Respondent's
partnership would be capable of paying her an annual salary
of $11,200 [T., p. 15).

On cross examination, however, this

testimony was found to be unreliable according to the accountant's own standards of income projection:

Q:

Mr. Erickson, are some months better than other
months in the business of Wild Flower?

A:

Yes, they are.

Q:

The first three months are rather slow, aren't
they?

A:

The first three months are, compared to the
final three months of the year, are slower.

Q:

In fact, in December of '76, there was a profit
for that month of $3,200 alone, wasn't there?

A:

That is correct.

Q:

And so the loss of $1,700 for three months is
really kind of meaningless without taking a look
at the projection for the last three months to
compare with it.
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A:

You would have to take into account the other nine
months' operations to make a projection.

Q:

So, your projection, when Mr. Sessions asked you,
was on the first three months.
You can't really
base it on three months, can you?

A:

No, you can't. You have to base it on prior years'
operations.
[T.,p. 17]

The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this testimony is
that despite the increase in Respondent's salary in 1977, the
partnership's first-quarter loss of $1,700 is not unusual in
light of the previous year's overall operation, since the
slower first-quarter is balanced by the more brisk final quarter of the year.

This is a picture of a healthy business

partnership whose increasing earnings are being distributed,
at least in Respondent's case, in the form of a higher salary.
The record shows that Respondent's present income is $1,700
per month.

The testimony of Respondent's accountant rebutting

that evidence was based on an analysis of only the first-quarter of the partnership's business year, an analysis which the
accountant himself acknowledged as deficient.
During 1976 Respondent was able to meet her needs and
those of the parties' minor children on an income of $20,873,
which included her salary plus a $9,000 draw upon her partnership equity [T., p. 13].

No evidence was adduced showing that

the standard of living enjoyed by Respondent at this income
level was substantially lower than that enjoyed by Respondent
during the marriage.

In 1977 Respondent's salary increased

to a figure of $20,400.

Therefore, Respondent's present salar

together with an award of child support in the sum of $400 per
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month ($200 per month per child), will provide her with an
income level of $25,200, well above her 1976 level.

To award

Respondent an additional $300 per month in alimony would provide
her a $3,600 annual windfall unjustified in terms of her needs.
B. APPELLANT IS PRESENTLY CONSTRAINED IN HIS ABILITY TO
CONTRIBUTE TO RESPONDENT'S SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE.
The trial court found Appellant's overhead expenses in
the operation of his medical practice to be $16,692, using as
its yardstick a figure of 20% of Appellant's total income
[R., p. 89, 11 6].

This estimate of Appellant's overhead expense

is grossly inaccurate in that it does not include Appellant's
costs for the purchase of medical malpractice insurance.
Appellant is a thoracic surgeon, a profession exposed to
the threat of medical malpractice lawsuits.

Appellant was not

covered by medical malpractice insurance at the time of the
hearing, but was in the process of obtaining such insurance.
Appellant testified that he had not previously been able to
afford such insurance coverage and estimated annual premiums
for malpractice insurance to be $30,000 [T., p. 39].
The "20% overhead expense allocation" adopted by the trial
court [R., p. 89, t 6] does not include malpractice insurance
premiums.

Further, that 20% figure was derived from Appellant's

1976 overhead expenses, which were unusually low.

Appellant

practiced for only 9 months during 1976; in the first three
months of his practice (March through May, 1976) he was afforded
the opportunity to share offices with a colleague at no overhead
cost whatever.

The "overhead expense allocation" referred to
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by the trial court actually represents only six months' operating expenses and is a serious underestimation of Appellant's
annual overhead.
Appellant estimated his annual overhead expense, including
malpractice premiums, to be $54,600 [Exhibit 8-D].

The impact

of the trial court's award of alimony and child support on
Appellant is reflected by applying Appellant's overhead expense,
together with the alimony and child support awarded to the
Respondent, to Appellant's total annual income, found to be

$ 8 3 I 4 61. 0 0 [ R .

I

p.

89 I

~[ 6 l

:

Total income

$83, 461. 00

Less overhead (including
malpractice premiums)

(54,600.00)

Less annual alimony ($300/mo.)
and child support ($700/mo.)

(12,000.00)

Income remaining for
Appellant

$16,861.0o*

In guag ing Appellant's ability to contribute to Respondent'
support and maintenance, the trial court 1) took no consideratic
of malpractice premiums in estimating Appellant's overhead
expenses, and 2) underestimated Appellant's overhead expenses
by relying on a year when said expenses were unusually low.

To

burden Appellant with unjustified alimony payments under these
conditions could postpone his purchase of malpractice insurance,
endangering his own financial well being and jeopardizing his

*

Since child support is taxable to Appellant, he would pay
taxes on $25,261.00.
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9
future ability to support the parties' minor children.
C.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF $350.00 PER
MONTH PER CHILD AS CHILD SUPPORT; SAID AWARD CONTAINS A HIDDEN
AWARD OF ALIMONY.
It is clear that the trial court, in derrogation of the
standard announced by this Court, has attempted to bring the
spendable incomes of the parties into parity.

It has employed

both child support and alimony awards as tools of equalization.
The award of $350.00 per month per child is unusually high.
The record does not show that $700 per month should reasonably
be spent solely to satisfy the needs of the two minor children
residing with Respondent.

It would appear that the trial court

has included in its child support award a hidden alimony payment.

The trial court has attempted to determine what total

amount, paid from Appellant to Respondent, will bring the
parties' spendable incomes into parity, and has then allocated
that amount between child support and alimony without reference
to the needs of the children or the Respondent.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132, this
Court stated that awards of alimony and child support are to
be based on separate grounds:

1) support of the divorced wife,

and 2) support of the minor children.
As indicated hereinabove, there is a variance between the findings and the decree with
respect to alimony and support money. The findings show an intention to award both, while the
decree refers to "alimony" for the "support of
the children." Alimony relates to support of the
divorced wife, and support money relates to the compensation to a spouse for the s~port of minor
Chlldren.
(172 P.2d at 135, emphasis added.]
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Appellant contends that a child support award of $350 per
month per child is not justified by the record (or, indeed, by
any finding of the trial court) in terms "related[d] to the
compensation to a spouse for the support of minor children."
Further, Appellant doubts whether it would be in the best
interests of the children to spend $700 per month solely for
their needs and desires.
Appellant contends that a reasonable sum to be awarded
Respondent for the support of the parties' two minor children
is $200.00 per month per child.

CONCLUSION
In awarding alimony to Respondent, the trial court failed
to employ the standard announced by this Court.

Alimony was

awarded without reference to Respondent's needs, her ability
to produce sufficient income, and Appellant's constrained
ability to contribute to her support and maintenance.

Under

the appropriate standard, an award of alimony is unjustified
and said award should be stricken or reduced to nominal.
The award of child support is excessive and unsupported
by the record.

It apparently includes a hidden award of ali-

mony which is intended to "spill over" to Respondent's benefit
without reference to the needs of the children.

A reasonable
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award of child support in this case is the sum of $200 per
month per child.
DATED this 22nd day of DECEMBER, 1977.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Attorney for Appellant
516 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Clark W. Sessions, Esq., Watkiss & Campbell, 12th Floor, 310
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this 22nd day
of DECEMBER, 1977.
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